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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHN SOTER and TOM SOTER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ZEKE SNYDER and STREVELL-PAT-
ERSON FINANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Civil No. 6180 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants' brief fairly states the issues of this case, how-
ever, since their action lies in fraud and deceit the full circum-
stances of the case will be presented with particularity in the 
argument section of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE SPECIAL FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DE-
FENDANT SNYDER DID NOT STATE IN SUBSTANCE: 
A. That he grossed over $50,000.00 in 1951, ~nd 
B. That he made a net profit of between $7,000.00 and 
$8,000.00 in 1951, 
IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE. 
POINT 2. 
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS NEGATIVE ANY 
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SNYDER IS IN 
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE AGREEMENT OF 
THE PAR TIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE SPECIAL FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DE-
FENDANT SNYDER DID NOT STATE IN SUBSTANCE: 
4 
r 
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A. That he grossed over $50,000.00 in 1951, and 
B. That he made a net profit of between $7,000.00 and 
$8,000 in 1951, 
IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE. 
The burden was upon the appellants (Soters) to prove 
fraud charged by clear and convincing evidence. 
Taylor v. Moore, 51 P. 2d 222 
Campbell v. Zion's Coop, 141 P. 401 
The respondents (Snyder and Strevell-Paterson) having 
prevailed, the evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to them. 
Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P. 2d 273 
The burden in an action in deceit based upon fraudulent 
representations was upon the plaintiffs to prove all of the essen-
tial elements: 
1. That a representation was made. 
2. Concerning a presently existing material fact. 
3. Which was false. 
4. Which the representer either. 
a. Knew to be false, or 
b. Made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
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5. For the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon 
it. 
6. That the other party, acting reasonably and in ignor-
ance of its falsity. 
7. Did in fact rely upon it. 
8. And was thereby induced to act. 
9. To his injury and damage. 
Stuck v .Delta Land and Water Co., 227 P. 791 
Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303 
23 Am. Jur. 772 
Let us examine the facts presented to the jury in the light 
of the law stated: 
Background Facts of the Delmar Transaction 
The Soters first contacted Snyder in August, 1952, answer-
ing a newspaper advertisement (R. 25, 58). They understood 
Snyder originally asked $27,500.00. Th~y suggested that Snyder 
accept their six-plex income property on a trade (R. 49). Snyder 
advised them a few days later he was not interested in a trade 
deal. 
The Soters dropped their interest in purchasing the Delmar 
following this call from Snyder and looked around the city 
for other beer taverns (R. 68). Sam's Lounge, 4th South and 
West Temple was investigated (R. 68). They actually entered 
into an earnest money agreement to purchase the Spa Beer 
Tavern, 4th South and Main Street, for about $12,000.00 
(R. 69), and forfeited deposit money when they decided the 
lease was not attractive. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
u~n One evening in November, 1952, the Soters testified they 
met a friend "Blackie," a bartender who worked at the Glen-
1~1· wood Club, across the street from the Delmar, and they advised 
Blackie of their continued interest in purchasing a beer tavern 
(R-71). Blackie recommended they buy the Delmar. 
"Across the street, the Delmar, that's a nice place 
and they seem to have a nice business" (R-71). 
Soter stated: 
"I talked to him (Snyder) before, but he wanted too 
much money, around $27,500.00 and I wouldn't pay 
that much money for it." 
Soter then asked Blackie to contact Snyder and determine 
if Snyder would accept less than $27,500.00 (R-71). 
About three to four days later, Blackie reported to Soter 
that he had contacted Snyder and he would cut the price to 
$25,000.00. Soter requested that Blackie continue to bargain 
for a lower price, and two to three days later, Blackie reported 
again to Soter that Snyder would agree to take $23,000 (R-72, 
171). 
Until the actual meeting of Snyder and the Soters at the 
Canton Cafe to consummate the deal held a few days later, 
Blackie had not disclosed to Snyder who his interested "buyers" 
were (R-75, 172, 176). The Soters then asked Blackie to ar-
range to meet Snyder with them a few days later to close 
the deal (R-72) ; until the Canton Cafe meeting the Soters 
directed no inquiry to Snyder about any phase of the business. 
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Business Experience of Purchasers 
At the date of the transaction between the parties, the 
plaintiffs had 17 to 18 years of experience in the beer business 
in Utah (R-46). Since 1933 they operated two places in Tooele 
County-Handy Corner Tavern and Lakeview Cafe (R-47). 
In 1948, the Soters sold out the beer places and purchased 
the Capitol Motor Lodge (State Street, Salt Lake City) for 
$110,000.00 (R-47). This property they sold in January, 1949. 
Prior to purchasing the Delmar Lounge from the defendant 
Snyder, the Soters owned a six-plex income apartment unit 
(R-49) which they originally requested Snyder to accept on a 
trade for the Delmar (R-49). In May 1953, nearly six months 
after the Delmar purchase, the plaintiffs negot~ated for the 
repurchase of the Capitol Motor Lodge, finally buying it back 
in October, 1953 (R-58) a 29-unit motel with restaurant. It 
is significant in retrospect that plaintiffs' repurchase of the 
Capitol Motor Lodge took place about 30 days after attempting 
to rescind the Delmar sale, nearly 11 months after the alleged 
fraud. 
The Agreement 
The title-retaining sales agreement (Plaintiff's ''Exhibit 
No. 1") provides the Soters pay $23,000.00 for the business 
and fixtures, payable $10,000.00 cash, $300.00 per month until 
fully paid, without interest. Concurrently, defendant Snyder 
executed an attractive lease to the plaintiffs for six years with 
an option for an additional five years at $500.00 per month 
rent (Plaintiffs' "Exhibit No. 2"). The lease provided, in the 
event hard liquor sales were permitted by law, the. rent would 
be an additional $50.00 per month. When the plaintiffs at-
g. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tempted to rescind the sales agreement September 3, 1953, they 
had paid an equity of $12,600.00 on the contract (R-14). Plain-
tiffs continued to make the monthly rental payments of $300.00 
only after being served with a Landlord's Demand to Pay 
Rent (R-232, "Exhibit 16-17"). 
The Transaction 
Tom Soter and his father came into the Delmar Lounge 
around the first of August, 1952, in reponse to Snyder's adver-
tisement (R-167). Snyder told them he wanted $27,500.00 on 
terms, or $25,000.00 cash for his place. Tom Soter suggested 
a trade on his six-plex. Snyder was not interested (R-168). 
Snyder showed them through the Lounge and said: "It would 
be a good buy for a partnership" (R-168). At the early meet-
ing in August, Snyder gave them the rent figure, the cost 
of bartender help, light and heat bills. Snyder testified: ''When 
I purchased the place I went to the beer distributors and asked 
them as to the amount that was sold to the place before I would 
buy it and I suggested they do the same" (R-169). The Soters 
then made no inquiry with respect to the amount of business 
R-169). Snyder told them he was making a nice living and if 
he couldn't get his price he wasn't interested in selling" 
(R-169.) 
Nothing more took place between the Soters and Snyder 
until a Friday night in November 1952, just before the election 
(R-171) when Blackie contacted Snyder on behalf of some 
interested parties (R-172). They haggled over the selling price 
and four days later Blackie arranged a meeting between Snyder 
and his interested parties at the Canton Cafe (R-173). 
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Mr. Snyder testified, under direct examination, his version 
of the entire Canton meeting set forth as follows: (R-17~·, 174, 
175, 176 and 177). 
"Q. Did you have any conversations with this person 
Blackie between this first meeting and the Canton 
meeting? 
A. He came back to me and told me we would meet 
at eight o'clock, that was all, that he would have 
the party there. 
Q. Did you know at that time who these parties were 
that he was ... 
A. No, I had no idea who the party was. 
Q. Now, just describe what took place at the meeting 
at the Canton Cafe, what you saw and what you 
heard, who was there and the whole substance of 
your conversation. 
A. I walked over from the Delmar to the Canton Cafe 
and waited on the outside, and these people - I 
waited until above five minutes after eight, and 
these people appeared, and it happened to be Tom 
Soter, who I had met before, and his brother, John, 
who I hadn't seen before, and they introduced me to 
John Soter. Blackie, of course, was there, and we 
went up into the balcony part of the cafe, and we 
ordered some coffee, and we started in talking, and 
they said they were interested in buying it, but the 
twenty-seven thousand .five hundred dollars didn't 
seem a right figure for them to pay. 
I says, 'Well, I don't know. Blackie had told me 
you wanted to pay cash for it, and I had told Blackie 
I had lowered the price to twenty-five thousand, 
which you had probably been told about.' 
So they asked me about the amount of business 
that I had done. I told them that I .. I says, 'There 
10 
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is only one way for you to get a true picture of 
buying a business. That is to see how much has 
been purchased. You have the privilege of going 
to the beer distributors and getting these figures; 
and in the meantime, if I shouldn't call, which I 
will call on if I get to it, you call me or have them 
call me if you are there in their business, and I 
will give them the authority to show you the books.' 
I says, 'And from the amount that you find out 
from the distributors and the costs that I have given 
you, the costs of the employees, the entertainment, 
and the rent and everything, including license and 
insurance, and the amount that we get for the 
product that we sell, you should determine from 
those figures whether I am making no money or 
not, because you have been in the beer business.' 
(Italics added.) 
So we finally got down to a figure. They still said 
it was too high, so we came down to twenty-three 
thousand dollars. I told them that I wanted to go 
into the used-car business. They says, 'Well, the 
twenty-three thousand dollars sounds all right to us.' 
I says, 'Well, twenty-three thousand cash.' 
They says, 'No, we will give you ten thousand 
down and the balance on terms of three hundred 
dollars a month.' 
I says, 'Well, if that is all the cash I am going to 
get, and to go into the used-car business, I would 
naturally need a little more money, and I would 
have to pay interest, so I think it isn't unfair if I 
should ask you for five per cent interest, and I know 
that I will have to pay six, eight, or possibly ten.' 
It turned out I pay one per cent a month, which 
happens to be twelve. They says, 'Well, why don't 
you give us a good deal' . . . 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Who said this? 
A. Tom and John both. 'Why don't you give us a good 
deal and not charge us any interest?' 
I says, 'Well,' I says, 'At least at the very mini-
mum for three per cent interest.' 
'No, we will take the place, and we want some-
thing we can make a living in.' 
I says, 'Well, you can make a living provided 
you both work a shift, but if you have no intention 
of working a shift, don't buy the Delmar.' 
They says, ·well, we are going to work a shift. 
That is why w~ are buying it.' 
Finally we come to an agreement that we would 
meet in Mr. Bernstein's office, who happened to be 
my attorney at the time, and draw up the papers, 
and in Mr. Bernstein's office I told them and I told 
them at the meeting provided they weren't given a 
license, and although the papers were signed and 
no license was available to them, but wouldn't be 
given to them, that they did not have to go through 
with their contract; and later on we went into the 
attorney's office and had the contract drawn up. 
Now when we went to Sam Bernstein's office, 
who happens to be in the same room with Mr. Metos, 
who is the plaintiff's attorney here, Mr. Bernstein 
drew up the lease and also the conditional sales 
contract. Mr. Metos read both. Tom Soter read them. 
I believe his father looked at them also. His brother, 
John Soter wasn't there at the time. Before Tom 
Soter signed the contract, the lease and the condi-
tional sales contract; Mr. Metus said to him, 'Now, 
this is what you want? You are sure you know 
what you are signing?' and Mr. Tom Soter said, 
'Why, yes. This isn't the first business I have ever 
bought.' 
12 
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Q. What date was that statement made? 
A. That was made on November 14, I believe, at the 
signing of the lease, the date of the sale. 
Q. Is that the date the lease bears ? 
A. I believe so. I believe the conditional sales. I'm not 
sure as to the lease. They took place over on De-
cember 1. 
Q. 14th day of November, both instruments bear that 
date. Now, referring again to the Canton Cafe be-
fore we get off that subject, did either John or Tom 
Soter ask you specifically how much business you 
had done in the year 1952 up until the time this 
conversation took place? 
A. They asked me how much business I was doing. I 
couldn't give them any figure in '52 because there 
wasn't any figure to give them. I told them over the 
period of years that I had operated the Delmar 
I presume it would average approximately fifty 
thousand a year. I had no books. 
Q. Did you bring any books with you that night? 
A. No, no books whatsoever. 
Q. Did they ask you to go get any books that night? 
A. No. I told them as far as books were concerned, I 
says, 'Anyone can give you a set of books.' I says, 
·you want the true figure. If you want the true pic-
ture, the only fay you can get the true picture is 
from the distributors.' 
Q. Were you asked by Blackie the night that you made 
this arrangement to bring your books with you at 
that meeting? 
A. No, sir. I didn't know who the party was even." 
Defendant Snyder's direct examination testimony regard-
ing the representations follows: (R-179) 
13 
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"Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder, to 
either Tom or John Soter, or his father, at any time, 
that you did fifty to sixty thousand dollars' worth 
of business a year and specifically in the year 1951. 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever asked a statement how much business 
did you do in the year 1951? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder, either 
to John or Tom Soter at any time that you made a 
profit of between seven to eight thousand dollars 
a year? 
A. I never said that I made a profit of seven or eight 
thousand dollars a year. I told them that I made a 
good living out of the Delmar, and I also stated 
that I figured it was a good living because I had 
paid twenty-eight hundred dollars a year payments 
on my home, and with the life insurance that I 
carry on my wife and myself I presume it would 
cost me in the neighborhood of five thousand 
dollars. It could have cost me less to live. There 
was no exact figure as to the amount that I had 
earned. 
Q. Did you ever make a statement with respect to how 
much money you were drawing out of the business? 
A. Yes. The same amount." 
Viewed by present-day business dealings between buyer 
and seller, the protest that this transaction was fraudulent had 
a hollow ring which seven of eight jurors recognized. 
The record is fully quoted to illustrate how completely fair 
Snyder dealt with the Soters. The Soters knew the beer business 
14 
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first-hand. They tried unsuccessfully to pawn off upon Snyder 
an exchange property of their own. Snyder told them unless 
he got his price he wasn't interested in selling and that the 
Delmar would be a good business provided the Soters worked 
behind the bar themselves (R-105). Snyder was not interested 
in selling at his first meeting and the Soters looked for other 
taverns. They investigated two others and actually made a 
deal forfeiting their deposit money because of a poor lease. 
Then they again sought out Snyder through Blackie as un-
disclosed parties, toward the end of obtaining a substantial 
price reduction. The Soters admitted relying upon Blackie's 
estimate of the business not Snyder's. The price reduction was 
their main objective and when the business failed to meet 
their expectation they cry fraud for the first time eleven months 
later. During the first three months of their operation knowing 
the business to be under expectation, the Soters induced Strevell-
Paterson Company to make a substantial loan to Snyder and 
admit in writing they have no other claim or set-off against 
the transaction. In March and April of 195 3 they list the prop-
erty for sale themselves and for $3,000.00 more than they paid 
(R-63). The whole key to this contest lies primarily in the 
Soters' desire to take back the Capitol Motor Lodge which 
they first attempted in May of 1953, six months after the Delmar 
deal, and finally succeed in doing in October 1953 (R-57-58). 
Again, on August 30, 195 3, the Soters treat the Delmar as 
their own and list it for sale with Thayne Adams Company 
at $25,000.00, $2,000.00 more than they paid Snyder (R-64). 
This jury wasn't blind to the fact that the Soters desired 
to get out of the Delmar deal in order to get back into the 
15 
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Capitol Motor Lodge deal. In order to give his full time to the 
Capitol management, one of the Soters quit barten~ing in 
October, 1953. Fraud was a clear afterthought that backfired. 
Mr. Snyder at no time represented the business earned 
a net profit of between $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 in 1951, or 
that he grossed in excess of $50,000.00 that year. What he 
said was that he drew that out of the) business to live on and 
over the years (since 1949) the business had averaged about 
$50,000.00 considering the total volume divided by the total 
number of years he had the business. 
Snyder invited the Soters to check with his beer suppliers 
and on that basis to determine if he was making an attractive 
profit. Soters' recollection that he had made this statement sev-
eral time was not clear (R-222). Finally, in July 1953, the Soters 
contacted these beer distributors (R-103) and did obtain this 
information, but over six months later. 
rry o Their Injury and Damage" 
The Soters produced their profit and loss statement at the 
trial showing their twelve months' operation from the date of 
purchase to November 30, 1953 (Ex. P-3). Once again their 
claim of fraud is exploded by neither damage nor injury, but 
relatively good business considering the fact that for the year 
1953-1954, all businesses were somewhat depressed. 
Their statement shows the following: 
16 
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Beer Sales ----------------------------------$3 3,069.9 3 
Soft Drink Mixers-------------------- 5,217.91 
Miscellaneous---------------------------- 617.95 
Amusement Machines ______________ 1,964.00 
Punch Boards---------------------------- 1,485.10 
Total Gross Receipts ----------------$42,354.89 
Cost of Merchandise Sold ________ 17,010.14 
Gross Profit on Total Recepits $25,344.75 
Less Operating Expenses: 
Salaries paid others ------------------ 4, 44 7.10 
Repairs and upkeep ------------------ 621.61 
Taxes and lic~nses -------------------- 1, 748.05 
Advertising ------------------------------ 101.4 5 
Miscellaneous ---------------------------- 400.28 
Utilities ______________________ -------------- 1,28 3. 3 2 
Sign rental maintenance------------ 407.21 
Rent ------------------------------------------ 6, 000.00 
Bad checks -------------------------------- 429.0 3 
Linen ---------------------------------------- 266.08 
Ice ---------------------------------------------- 200.01 
Insurance ---------------------------------- 5 82.12 
Depreciation ------------------------------ · 2,310.00 
Total operating expenses__________ $18,796.26 
Net Profit before owners' salaries $ 6,548.49 
The Soters' net profit after taking a depreciation loss of 
$2,}10.00, the cost of the business over ten years, is in excess 
of $6,500.00 and including depreciation equals $8,858.49. It is 
a little hard to understand what injury and damage actually 
resulted to the Soters from their own figures. Their own figures 
betray their claim of any damage. 
17 
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In the light of the background of all the facts necessary 
to make out the fraud case, it is not· difficult to understand the 
jury's finding. Applying the formula for fraud, the Soters 
would bat exactly zero on each of the nine elements constituting 
fraud by the previous decisions of this Court. 
POINT 2. 
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS NEGATIVE ANY 
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION. 
Approximately three months after the sale of the Delmar 
Lounge respondent Zeke Snyder negotiated a loan with Strevell-
Paterson Finance Company offering the contract between him-
self and the Soters as collateral security for the repayment 
of such loan. Before making the loan Strevells required a state-
ment from appellants as to the amount owning by them to Mr. 
Snyder, as well as an acknowledgment that there were no off-
sets or claims against said amount. 
This statement of balance owing was introduced in evi-
dence as Exhibit D-4 and was identified by John Soter, who on 
cross examination testified that the statement was signed in 
the latter part of February after appellants had sustained a 
loss for the months of December and January and were behind 
for the month of February (R. 107-108). Mr. Soter further 
testified that he was informed by respondent that the latter 
was attempting to make a loan; "that Strevells wanted to make 
sure appellants don't have any claims or off-sets against that 
amount (R.108) and: 
18 
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"Q. As a matter of fact, when Mr. Snyder gave you 
that statement to sign, you didn't make any protest 
about it, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't tell him you were reluctant to sign it, 
did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't tell Strevell-Paterson you were reluctant 
to sign? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You signed it, didn't you? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And you read it over before you signed it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you knew Mr. Snyder couldn't get his loan un-
less you signed it? 
A. I guess that's right. 
Q. You had business with Strevell before? 
A. We have, yes. 
Q. And when you did business and made a loan, they 
required security? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And you knew they were requiring verification of 
this contract and the fact that there was no dispute 
between you before they would loan Mr. Snyder 
that money? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you signed it so he could get the loan? 
A. Exactly. 
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Q. And you didn't call Strevell's and tell them any-
thing about it? 
A. No, sir." 
If there had been any representation ,made to appellants 
by respondent Snyder as to the volume of business done or his 
"take-home pay" upon which from the business appellants 
relied on entering into the contract for the purchase of the 
Delmar Lounge as claimed in the pleadings, then surely ap-
pellants would have refused to sign any statement admitting 
there were no off-sets or charges but would have questioned 
the contract at that time and would have protected themselves 
with respect to the matter. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SNYDER IS IN 
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE AGREEMENT 
OF THE PARTIES. 
The Soters entered into an absolute and unconditional 
promise to pay Snyder $23,000.00 for the business and fixtures. 
They breached their agreement on September 3, 195 3, after 
paying in $10,000.00 cash, eight monthly payments of $300.00 
each, making a total of $12,400.000, owing Snyder the balance 
of $10,600.00 and flatly refusing the pay him any more. 
Utah does not have a Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 
and in almost all jurisdictions, whether the Act is in effect 
or not, a conditional vendee's promise to pay the purchase 
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price gives the vendor the absolute right to the purchase price 
where that promise to pay is unconditional. 
47 Am. fur. Sales, Section 894 p. 102 
Appellants' single case authority, American-La France Fire 
Engine Co. v. Bagge (1929) District Court of Appeal, Third 
District, California, 276 P. 1066, is not authority for his propo-
sition since a collateral agreement rendered the promise to pay 
conditional. 
Granted that defendant Snyder had the right of repos-
sesion upon buyers' default, he was likewise entitled to have 
his just demands against the defaulting purchasers satisfied. 
Snyder had several methods of securing this right. He could 
have retaken the property or he could have recovered the 
purchase price. The fact that he had the right to retake pos-
session does not restrict or bar his right to recover the purchase 
price. 47 Am. fur. Sales, Section 895, P. 103. 
Appellants have confused Snyder's substantive rights with 
his procedural rights. Snyder is entitled to only one satisfaction 
against the buyers and that is what he sought here, a judgment 
for the balance due under the contract. See 101 ALR 520, and 
18 Am. fur., Section 36, P. 156. 
To limit Snyder only to retake possession after default 
would be totally unjust, for the Soters also were tenants of 
Snyder of his real property. By keeping up the monthly lease 
payments and defaulting on the fixture agreement, the Soters 
would, by their reasoning compel Snyder to retake the fixtures 
while requiring him to rent them his premises. 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The contract language is clear. Upon failure of the Soters 
to make the payments, Snyder declared the entire purchase price 
due and upon the Soters' failure to pay the accelerated sum, 
the contract provides Snyder "may" retake possession of the 
property. This right to elect a remedy should not prevent the 
conditional seller from standing on the contract and suing for 
the full purchase price. Appellants contend the legal effect of 
this paragraph is to give Snyder only one remedy upon the 
Soters' default. The law is otherwise and it should be so, even 
without statutory provision. The Court awarded judgment to 
Snyder in the sum of $10,600.00 together with interest, and 
required that upon the paym<:)nt in full of said judgment, 
Snyder shall deliver to the Soters full title to all of the per-
sonal property, an Order that is entirely consistent with the 
Seller's remedies and the Buyer's rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This case was fully tried and considered by a jury and 
Court. We respectfully submit that the judgment appealed 
from should be affirmed. 
Dated this 4th day of August, 1954. 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorney for Defendant Zeke Snyder 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Defendant Strevell-
Paterson Finance Company, a corporation 
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